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Abstract:	Persecution,	as	a	political	and	economic	phenomenon,	can	be	abetted	by	the	
resources	 of	 a	 nation's	 elite.	 To	 demonstrate	 this,	 I	 focus	 on	 a	 case	 study:	witchcraft	
trials	 in	Early	Modern	Scotland	 (1563-1727),	a	 largely	agricultural	economy.	 I	 find	 that	
favourable	 growing	 temperatures	 predict	more	 trials.	My	main	 empirical	 specification	
survives	 various	 robustness	 checks,	 including	 accounting	 for	 outliers.	During	 this	 time,	
witchcraft	was	a	secular	crime,	and	it	was	incumbent	on	local	elites	to	commit	resources	
to	 trying	 alleged	 witches.	 Turning	 to	mechanisms,	 I	 find	 that	 positive	 price	 shocks	 to	
export-heavy,	 taxable	goods	predict	more	witch	 trials,	while	price	shocks	 to	Scotland's	
main	subsistence	commodity,	oats,	do	not.	This	 is	consistent	with	the	explanation	that	
as	 elite	 income	 increased,	more	 resources	were	 devoted	 to	witchcraft	 prosecutions;	 I	
cite	 anecdotal	 evidence	 that	 a	 different	 judicial	 proceeding,	 sexual	 trials	 in	 Aberdeen,	
experienced	a	similar	trend.	
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1 Introduction
Today’s wealthiest countries have strong fiscal and legal state capacity
(Dincecco and Katz, forthcoming). Centralized states are associated with
beneficial outcomes: less poverty (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013),
more stability (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Besley and Persson, 2011), and
better public goods provision (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Dell, 2017). Indeed, the
correlation between high living standards and various state capacity mea-
sures is well established (Johnson and Koyama, 2017).
Yet there is a deleterious, and even dark, side to state capacity. The po-
litical scientist Raul Hillberg (1961) details the grutesque political and eco-
nomic architecture of the Holocaust, finding that a well financed and or-
ganized Nazi state facilitated genocidal ghettos and concentration camps.
Tilly (1990) finds that state formation is often violent, and that early na-
tion states were, in essence, organized crime syndicates writ large, offering
protection in exchange for rents. More recent evidence also suggests that
state capacity can facilitate persecution (Heldring, 2017; Bloxham, 2008; Rae,
2002).
In this paper, I focus on how elites, as state actors, can influence policy to
drive persecution. Here, I define an ‘elite’ person as one who wields signifi-
cant political or legal power over others; elites include nobles, wealthy mer-
chants, and sherrifs. Mechanisms through which elites can generate hatred
and persecution have been investigated before (Glaeser, 2005; Anderson et
al., 2017), but few if any studies have examined, empirically, how economic
resources can mould elite actions. In this regard, I am especially interested
in how economic shocks affect elite income and spending: if persecution is
a vital part of an elite’s choice function, then to what extent does a rise in
elite resources cause persecution to proliferate?
To help answer this question, I use data from Early Modern Scotland
(1563-1727) to examine a particular type of persecution, made possible throu-
gh strong legal state capacity, as well as local-level elite resources: witch
hunts, which were motivated by a genuine belief that witches are evil. Scot-
tish law, which made witchcraft a secular crime in 1563, required local elites
– lairds, burgesses, sheriffs, and others – to commit resources to trying
witches. When these resources, which were mainly derived from taxation
of Scottish economic activity, were more ample, witchcraft prosecutions in-
creased. In particular, there were five stages of a Scottish witchcraft prosecu-
tion. First, the witch had to be identified. Secondly, local communities had
to invest time and funds into gathering evidence. Third, such evidence was
couriered to Edinburgh, in order to receive official government approval to
proceed with a trial. In the fourth stage, the local community would stage a
trial, paying for the requisite expenses. Finally, if the witch was convicted,
and she usually was, then she would be executed. At each stage of this pro-
cess, elites had to use their locally-derived tax revenue in order to purge the
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land of witchcraft, through formal legal means.
Consistent with this, and given that Scotland was an agricultural econ-
omy, I find that favourable (warmer) temperatures predict more trials. This
is robust to county-specific time trends, different specifications, placebo tests
using forward lags, and accounting for peaks and troughs (outliers). This
fits with the theoretical prediction that when agricultural output improves
due to better weather, elites’ tax income rises, which allows them to spend
more on witchcraft trials.
Turning to mechanisms, I document secondary historical evidence that
Scottish elites derived income from export-heavy, taxable commodities such
as herring and wool. When the prices of these items rose, the elites could
extract more taxable income, which could then permit more trials to be
funded. Using commodity prices as a proxy variable for tax income, I find
that positive price shocks to herring and wool predict more trials. As a
falsification exercise, I find that shocks to Scotland’s main subsistence com-
modity, oats, do not predict trials, since this crop was not a major source of
taxable income, and was mainly consumed by peasants. I provide histor-
ical evidence that these patterns were not due to avarice, since witchcraft
suspects had little valuable property, and trials themselves were costly.
My paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I review related literature,
and demonstrate my study’s contribution. In Section 3, I provide historical
background. In Section 4, I describe my empirical strategy and data in order
to identify the causal impact of shocks on witch trials. Section 5 provides
my results, along with robustness checks and mechanisms. In Section 6, I
conclude with a short reflection on policy applications.
2 Related Literature
Elite resources and oppression are evident throughout history’s great
persecutions; the 1915-1916 Armenian genocide, for example, relied upon
local authorities, empowered with Young Turks ideology, rounding up and
killing Armenians. These local Ottoman social and political elites had been
indoctrinated with anti-Christian ideology, due to Ottoman territorial losses
to Europeans and Russia (Bloxham, 2008). In a later violent episode, the
Bosnian civil war of 1992-1995, local Muslim elites, for economic reasons,
fomented Muslim on Muslim slaughter, in order to cement their author-
ity over competing Muslim leaders (Christia, 2008). More recent work has
emphasized that such elite competition can be key in explaining state for-
mation (Garfias, 2018). In my study, I am likewise concerned with the in-
teractions between state capacity, local elites, and persecution of so-called
witches.
Scottish elites required resources in order to try suspected witches; my
study investigates the idea that times of economic well-being can cause vi-
olence, in the form of witchcraft persecutions, and thus reinforces and illus-
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trates an important literature in this area (Hsiang et al., 2013; Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004; Miguel et al., 2004). In particular, Bazzi and Blattman (2014)
have stressed the need for case study evidence in order to disentangle un-
derlying mechanisms. By examining witchcraft trials in Early Modern Scot-
land, I focus on a single case study, and am therefore able to uncover mech-
anisms that drive the link between temperature shocks and witch trials,
while limiting confounding factors. This is an important contribution, since
economic channels that drive conflict and violence are still ill understood,
though recent research has made progress in this direction (Dell, 2015; Fet-
zer, 2014; Dube and Vargas, 2013).
Dube and Vargas (2013) use data on the Colombian conflict in the 1990s
and early 2000s to identify two widely-discussed mechanisms: the oppor-
tunity cost effect, and the rapacity effect. The former effect states that when
the value of being violent rises, relative to other activities, then violence it-
self increases (Besley and Persson, 2011; Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2011; Angrist
and Kugler, 2008). For example, if agricultural wages decline, then farm
workers are more likely to join guerrilla squads. The rapacity effect, and
its analogue the state prize effect, claims an opposite impact: higher income
means that there is more to fight over (Hirshleifer, 1991; Grossman, 1999). If,
say, oil prices rise, then paramilitaries are more likely to attack oil fields and
kidnap oil executives. Although I find that positive environmental shocks
predict more witch trials, this is not due to a rapacity effect. Rather, it is due
to the ability of local elites to finance a trial.
The papers closest to mine in subject matter are Oster (2004), Miguel
(2005), Johnson and Koyoma (2014), and Leeson and Russ (2018). Oster
uses time series data to document a negative relationship between air tem-
peratures and witch trials in Early Modern Europe, and argues that poor
economic conditions prompt such trials. Unlike Oster, I focus on a single
case study, Scotland, which had more centralised institutions than the rest
of Europe for prosecuting witches. My data uncover a different result: posi-
tive economic shocks predict more witchcraft trials. I also provide empirical
evidence for an explicit mechanism driving this result.
Miguel’s (2005) study of Tanzania suggests a similar mechanism as Os-
ter’s: when rainfall is low, people kill unproductive members of society by
blaming them for witchcraft. Tanzania, however, does not have the legal in-
stitutions that Scotland had for dealing with witchcraft accusations. Killings
of alleged witches in Tanzania are much more decentralised, and are often
carried out by family or community members without judicial restraint. In
Scotland, sizable costs were incurred to ensure that legal procedure was car-
ried out before a witch was executed, and it is not at all clear that alleged
Scottish witches were economic burdens.
Johnson and Koyama (2014) investigate witchcraft trials in France be-
tween 1550 and 1700, and argue that increases in fiscal capacity strength-
ened rule of law, reducing the number of witchcraft trials. Again, Scottish
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trials were different from France’s in this regard, since Scottish trials were
more centralised, and followed rather strict judicial guidelines. My study
addresses a different question: whether economic shocks caused witchcraft
trials.
Leeson and Russ’s (2018) study examines witch trials across Europe, and
finds that non-market competition between Catholics and Protestants ac-
count for much of the variation in trials. I am interested in a different ques-
tion, that of local elites. Focusing on a particular European country, Scot-
land, during the age of witch hunts, allows me to examine in detail institu-
tional particulars. My explanation, moreoever, does not contradict Leeson
and Russ’s; it is possible that both religious competition and funding for
trials mattered.
Because most Scottish witch suspects were women, this paper contributes
to the literature on violence against women.1 Estimates find that intimate
partner violence, and sexual violence against women, cost as much as $4.49
trillion per year, or 5.3% of world GDP (Fearon and Hoeffler, 2014). Causes
of domestic violence, in particular, have been well-studied and include wo-
men’s household bargaining power (Doss, 2013; Bloch and Rao, 2002) and
emotional cues that prompt male spouses to act aggressively (Card and
Dahl, 2011). In Early Modern Europe, women were viewed as inferior and
corruptible beings, more naturally prone to witchcraft than men, which
caused them to be hunted as witches (Rowlands, 2013). I find that posi-
tive weather shocks, and the resulting income boost to elites’ coffers, can
precipitate these acts of violence.
This paper contributes to the literature on historical witchcraft trials by
using a panel dataset to study the impact of temperature on Scottish trials.
Historians have postulated a number of factors that contributed to witch
trials, including changing religious values (Levack, 2006), state expansion
(Larner, 1981), and patriarchy (Apps and Gow, 2003). I offer another expla-
nation: the costs of financing a trial must be sufficient.
Finally, a growing literature in political economics has examined perse-
cutions (Jha, 2013; Voigtlander and Voth, 2012; Waldinger, 2010) . For in-
stance, Anderson et al. (2017) find that bad weather shocks predict more
Jewish expulsions from European cities between 1100 and 1800. The au-
thors claim that these expulsions are driven by political economy concerns,
as local rulers scapegoat Jews for economic woes. My story is also a political
economy one, driven by the ability of local elites to finance a trial.
3 Historical Background
The Protestant Reformation consolidated itself in Scotland in 1560, when
Edinburgh’s Parliament formally rejected papal authority. Prior to the Ref-
1 Roughly 85% of Scottish witch suspects were women.
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ormation, witches were, at worst, seen as beings to be appeased, not per-
secuted. The Reformation changed this with its insistence on deliberate
eradication of evil, thus making witchcraft a secular crime in 1563 with the
Scottish Witchcraft Act (Cowan, 2008). The cultural reasons behind this are
beyond this study’s scope, though other authors have covered this in detail
(Goodare, 2013; Roper, 1994; Smout, 1973).
Historical evidence suggests that central authorities, especially the Privy
Council in Edinburgh, were able to exert some influence over proceedings,
so that no local trials occurred without first going through Edinburgh.2 Lo-
cal authorities were indeed content to have their trials sanctioned by cen-
tral bureaucracy. According to a number of scholars, central control over
witchcraft prosecutions was an important part of state building in Early
Modern Scotland, a country that was otherwise difficult to govern (Dillinger,
2013; Larner, 1981). Although Larner (1981) finds that both elites and com-
moners believed in witches’ magic, the former were content to use the lat-
ters’ beliefs towards a secondardy objective: legal discipline, an important
aspect of nation-building.3
There were five stages of most Scottish witch hunts (Goodare, 2002):
1. A witch is identified locally.
2. Evidence is gathered through local kirks (churches) and elites.
3. The Privy Council or parliament in Edinburgh reviews the evidence,
and grants permission to local elites and witch hunters to set up a
‘commission of judiciary’ to try the accused.
4. The commission tries the witch.
5. The convicted witch is executed.
The bulk of expenses for the trial was incurred locally. The Privy Council
was very interested in ensuring that proper judicial procedure was carried
out, in order to prevent witch trials from descending into decentralised and
unregulated lynchings.
The first stage, the identification of an alleged witch, happened locally.4
A triggering event, such as a death in the family, would incite Scottish peo-
ple to accuse neighbours of witchcraft. It usually took years before a neigh-
bour’s accusation of witchcraft would result in a formal complaint, a pattern
consistent with the rest of Europe (Briggs, 1998). Another way to identify
2 Treason was the only other crime to enjoy such a level of central oversight (Larner, 1981).
3 The fact that educated elites believed in the Devil and his allegiance with witches is
most apparent in King James’s scholarly treatise, Daemonologie, which argues that witches
should be killed.
4 An important exception, the 1590 North Berwick trials, started when King James accused
witches of trying to sink his ship. However, even these trials relied on local identification
of suspected witches.
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a witch was for already accused witches to name their co-conspirators, al-
though such evidence was given less weight.
In the second stage, a confession was sought, and this stage often in-
volved torture. Sleep deprivation was commonly used, and was very ef-
fective in obtaining confessions, since it led to hallucinations (Dudley and
Goodare, 2013). This stage might involve local kirk (church) officials, who
otherwise had a very limited role in witchcraft prosecutions. Local officials
and elites had to ensure that the evidence collected during this stage was
suitable for Edinburgh’s vetting.
The third stage involved acquiring Privy Council or parliament’s per-
mission to set up a commission of judiciary, composed of local elites (lairds,
burgesses, justices, etc.) to try a witch. As Levack (2008) says,
Most cases... were adjudicated by local authorities who peti-
tioned the privy council or parliament for permission... These lo-
cal commissioners then assembled an assize (jury) to determine
innocence or guilt, which in most cases turned out to be the lat-
ter. (p. 4)
It was at this stage that the central government in Edinburgh got in-
volved in local affairs. However, besides granting permission, the Privy
Council and parliament usually did not intervene directly in local trials.
The trial itself, the fourth stage, relied on four types of evidence: con-
fessions, neighbours’ testimony, other witches’ testimony, and The Devil’s
Mark. This last proof, either a visible blemish or insensitive spot on the
body, was discovered by court examiners or professional witch-prickers. It
was a sign of a witch having made a Satanic pact.5 Once witchcraft was
established, the witch was strangled at the stake until dead, and her body
was subsequently burned.
To attain a more concrete analysis, I cite Paterson (2013), who uses case
study evidence from Scottish witchcraft prosecutions to examine trial ex-
penses. In 1596, when a day-labourer’s wages were 40 pence per day (Gib-
son and Smout, 1994), it cost £20 to imprison a witch in Aberdeen.6 This
paid for the accused’s sustenance, as well as the costs of extracting a con-
fession. Elites paid the amount; as Paterson documents, the bill was laid
upon a laird’s estate, a burgh council composed of merchant elites, or a
town council comprised of local elites and magistrates. Although a witch’s
property was sometimes seized to pay part of the trial costs, most witches
had little valuable property, and the bulk of expenses were paid by local
elites.7
5 The pact was sexual in nature, culminating in a witches’ orgy.
6 There were 240 pence in one Scottish pound.
7 Although these figures sketch an indication of the scale of the witchcraft trial, I am not
aware of any figures of elite income, which limits my ability to compare the costs of a
trial against a median elite’s budget constraints. That being said, I would assume these
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The last Scottish witchcraft trial was in 1727, and witchcraft was re-
moved from secular criminal offenses in 1736. Historians investigating the
decline and end of Scottish witch hunting have concluded that lawyers be-
came less convinced about the validity of evidence in witchcraft cases: con-
fessions under tortures were seen as questionable, and witch-pricking for
the Devil’s Mark was exposed as fraudulent (Wasser, 2008; Levack, 2008).
An example of a specific witchcraft trial helps to elucidate specifics. I
take this case study from Larner (1981), who describes the stories of two
women, of uncertain age, tried and executed for witchcraft in the town of
Dumfries, in 1671. One of them, Janet Macmurdoch, had several accusors,
including John Moor of Barlay, whose accusations dated from 1665, over
Macmurdoch’s unpaid rent. When John Moor impounded Janet’s livestock,
she cursed him, allegedly causing his child to subsequently die. Another
accusor, John Murray of Laik, accused Janet of evil actions she committed
in 1664, and Jean Sprot, another plaintiff, was cursed by Janet in the same
year, causing Jean to suffer a strange disease. Clearly, it took a long time for
accusations to come to fruition, in the form of a formal trial.
The jury consisted of small lairds and grand tenants, men of prominence,
from a ten-mile radius around Dumfries. This assize had to travel over
rough terrain, in order to preside over Janet’s trial. This pattern reflects
Scotland’s rural character at the time: as Larner (1981) says, there were scat-
tered villages instead of nucleated towns, a trend different from England’s.
On May 18, 1671, Janet Macmurdoch was executed, and her body burned.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1 Empirical Strategy
To test for the effects of temperature on witchcraft trials, I estimate the
following specification:
Witch Triali,t = βShocki,t + δi + ηt + i,t. (1)
Here, Witch Triali,t is either a dummy for whether or not a trial occurred,
or a count for the number of witchcraft trials in county i in year t.
Shocki,t is simply a temperature shock, where temperature is measured
as a deviation from an average over the period 1961-1990. In my speci-
fications, I use either a three-year, five-year, or ten-year moving average
for temperature. The reason I use moving averages is because historians
have documented that it took a long buildup for witchcraft suspicions to
become full-blown accusations - sometimes as long as twenty years (Larner,
1981). To examine mechanisms related to agricultural commodities, I use
costs to have been significant, especially since Scottish lairds were not as wealthy as their
English counterparts.
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Suitabilityi × Pricet for the shock, where Suitability is county i’s suitability
for the particular commodity, while Pricet is its price on world markets in
year t.
δi and ηt are county and year fixed effects, respectively. I use these to
control for omitted heterogeneity at the level of counties and time periods. I
also report county-specific trends for robustness. The equation is estimated
using OLS, and I cluster standard errors by county.
My identification strategy is based on the fact that temperature and world
commodity prices are exogenous from a single county’s point of view. A
negative coefficient on β implies that the shock negatively predicts unrest,
while a positive coefficient β means that the shock positively predicts un-
rest. In northern Europe, unlike tropical zones such as Africa, higher tem-
perature are better for agriculture.
4.2 Data
I acquire witchcraft trial data from the online Survey of Scottish Witchcra-
ft, which is available through the University of Edinburgh. The database
was derived from previously existing printed data, and was enhanced throu-
gh extensive archival research. Not all of those who were tried were ex-
ecuted: of the 305 cases we know the outcome for, 205 were executed, 52
were acquitted, and the rest were banished. However, while this sample
gives an execution rate of 67%, the Survey’s researchers believe that the ac-
tual execution rate was much higher, since this sample mostly comprises tri-
als at Edinburgh’s justiciary court, which followed judicial procedure more
rigidly than the vast majority of courts. The Survey offers wide coverage
of the year and county of witchcraft trials, for 3,098 witch suspects. For
additional documentation, please see the Survey’s website.8
Weather data for this period are scant, and the only panel data avail-
able for Europe are from Guiot and Corona (2010). These authors collect
data from proxy sources, including ninety-five tree ring series, sixteen in-
dexed climate series based on archives, ice-core series, and pollen series to
construct grids of reconstructed growing-season (April to September) tem-
perature for Europe from 900 AD to today. I use geospatial software to
match counties with their nearest grid points. The measured temperatures
are based on deviations from the 1961-1990 average.
There is substantial evidence that warmer temperatures in northern Eu-
rope are better for agriculture (Olesen and Bindi, 2002). Studies of Early
Modern northern Europe have shown that warmer temperatures predict
lower wheat prices (Waldinger, 2014) and greater grain yield (Holopainen
and Helama, 2009). Parry (1975), in particular, examined cereal cultivation
in south-east Scotland from the late Middle Ages to the the eighteenth cen-
tury, and found that colder temperatures substantially reduce yields. It is
8 http://www.shca.ed.ac.uk/Research/witches/
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therefore a sound assumption, for my analysis, that warmer temperatures
improve agricultural conditions.
Scottish counties during this period look very different than they do
today. Because no digital map of Early Modern Scottish counties is eas-
ily available, I constructed a map, using Geographic Information Software
(QGIS), based on The Atlas of Scottish History to 1707. This gives me borders
of counties that existed from 1563 to 1727, the years of my analysis.
In my specifications, I always control for population density, since this
could impact trials. These data are from the History Database of the Global
Environment (HYDE), and are available for the years 1500, 1600, 1700, 1710,
1720, and 1730.9 HYDE data are based on historical sources of population
numbers. Because there are gaps in my data, I linearly interpolate between
years, within counties, to construct a balanced panel.
Price data, in real amounts, are from the Allen-Unger database. These
data were collected by Robert C. Allen and Richard W. Unger based on var-
ious sources, and contain the price of commodities in grams of silver per
litre. I examine three commodities in my analysis: wool, herring, and oats.
None of the price data come from Scotland, but rather from important trad-
ing posts and cities from around the world, like Massachusetts, London, and
Paris. Based on the Atlas of Scottish History to 1707, I located and mapped
Scotland’s eight major trading ports: Leith, Glasgow, Bo’ness, Dundee, Ayr,
Aberdeen, Burntisland, and Inverness. I then located the Allen-Unger loca-
tion that is closest to Scotland in that particular time period, and used the
commodity price from that port.
For wool, there is only one port for this period, “England.” Herring
price data are from Antwerp, “England,” Frankfurt, Linkoping, and Lon-
don. There are gaps in the herring price data, which I used linear interpola-
tion to fill.
For oats, I use the price for London from 1550 to 1565, “Southern Eng-
land” from 1566 to 1702, and Coutances for 1702 onwards.10. I also use oats
price data with Gibson and Smout’s (1994) price series for Scotland, which
contains oats prices for Fife. Although oats prices from other regions are
also available, Fife has the widest coverage. The correlation between the
Allen-Unger oats price, and that from Gibson-Smout, is 0.2872, with cor-
responding p-value 0.0058. Clearly, the two price series for oats are well-
correlated with each other.
Suitability for growing oats is from the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database. I use the values for
rainfed, low input oats suitability, and merge this with my map of Scotland.
Because oats suitability may not identify where oats were actually grown
historically, I also use cropland usage data from the History Database of the
Global Environment for the year 1500. For pasture land, I acquire data from
9 http://themasites.pbl.nl/tridion/en/themasites/hyde/
10 There is a gap in this data for the year 1582, for which I use the oats price from Antwerp
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Ramankutty and Foley (1999), which helps me to identify the suitability for
herding sheep. Finally, for herring, I use information from Rorke’s (2005)
article on the Scottish herring trade from 1470 to 1600; instead of a contin-
uous suitability measure, I use an indicator, since Rorke describes whether
or not a region caught herring for export.
Table 1 - Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Main Results
Witch Trials Count 5,610 0.55 4.16 0 116
Witch Trials Dummy 5,610 0.10 0.30 0 1
Temperature (3 year MA) 5,610 0.16 0.42 -1.11 1.83
Temperature (5 year MA) 5,610 0.16 0.35 -0.81 1.73
Temperature (10 year MA) 5,610 0.16 0.29 -0.55 1.30
Population Density 5,610 4,008 11,028 18.36 93,331
Commodity Price Shocks
Suitability × Price Wool (3 year MA) 5,610 8.78 3.25 0.78 16.74
Suitability × Price Wool (5 year MA) 5,610 8.78 3.17 0.81 15.98
Suitability × Price Wool (10 year MA) 5,610 8.77 3.05 0.88 15.26
Suitability × Price Herring (3 year MA) 5,610 0.64 1.01 0 3.96
Suitability × Price Herring (5 year MA) 5,610 0.63 1.01 0 3.90
Suitability × Price Herring (10 year MA) 5,610 0.62 0.99 0 3.68
Suitability × Price Oats (3 year MA) 5,610 0.02 0.005 0.009 0.04
Suitability × Price Oats (5 year MA) 5,610 0.02 0.005 0.01 0.04
Suitability × Price Oats (10 year MA) 5,610 0.02 0.005 0.01 0.03
Compliers
Distance from Edinburgh: above median 34 0.5 0.5 0 1
Times of crisis: indicator 5,610 0.05 0.23 0 1
Justices of the Peace: above median 33 0.48 0.5 0 1
Distance from a Port: above median 34 0.5 0.5 0 1
County-level fixed effects mean that I do not need to control for time-
invariant county characteristics. However, I interact variables, such as dis-
tance from Edinburgh and justices of the peace, with my independent vari-
able to test for heterogenous responses of trials to weather shocks. These
are above-median indicators. For example, if distance from Edinburgh is
greater than median, I code this as a 1, and as a 0 otherwise. I acquire jus-
tices of the peace data from the Atlas of Scottish History to 1707; this is the
average number of justices over the period 1587 to 1663, when data is avail-
able.
Summary statistics for my dependent variables, shocks of interest, and
county characteristics are shown in Table 1. I also provide a map of the total
number of witchcraft trials over this period in Figure 1. As can be seen, Ed-
inburgh and East Lothian (Haddington) had the most intense witch-hunting.
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In Figure 2, I plot the 5 year moving average of temperature against
witchcraft trials, from 1563 to 1727. The horizontal line, in the graph, is
the mean value of the 5-year moving average of temperature over this pe-
riod. As can be seen, when the temperature variable is below its mean,
witchcraft trials are less likely to occur. I exploit this variation as part of my
identification strategy.11
Figure 1 - Total Number of Witchcraft Trials, 1563-1727
under 40
40 - 100
100 - 274
274 - 462
over 462
11 In the appendix, I include figures for the 3-year and 10-year moving averages of temper-
ature, plotted against witchcraft trials. These are Figures A1 and A2.
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Figure 2 - Total Number of Witchcraft Trials against Temperature (5 Year Moving Av-
erage), 1563-1727
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5 Results
5.1 Main Results
In Table 2, I report my main results for witch trials from 1563 to 1727,
using three different moving averages for 3 years, 5 years, and 10 years. In
these regressions, I report two sets of standard errors. First, I report stan-
dard errors that cluster at the county level. Second, I report Conley (1999)
standard errors, which account for spatial correlation, for a radius up to
100km from the center of a county, and arbitrary temporal correlation, up to
10 lags. As can be seen, positive shocks to temperature predict more trials,
and the results are generally significant. Not all columns report significant
results; Column (1), in particular, shows that, regardless of the reported
standard errors, a 3-year moving average of temperature does not signifi-
cantly predict witchcraft trials; that being said, the magnitude of the effect
is large, since according to the coefficient estimate, a standard deviation rise
in the temperature variable causes a 0.05 standard deviation rise in trials.
These magnitudes are also reflected in other columns. For example, in col-
umn (2), a standard deviation increase in temperature causes a 0.06 standard
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deviation increase in trials. In column (5), a standard deviation increase in
temperature causes a 0.14 standard deviation increase in the probably of a
trial, or 4.06%. All regressions control for county-level population density,
which might also predict trials.
Table 2 - Effect of Temperature Shocks on Witchcraft Trials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Count Count Count Dummy Dummy Dummy
Temperature (3 year MA) .548 .104
(.504) (.046)**
[.485] [.037]***
Temperature (5 year MA) .711 .116
(.341)** (.040)***
[.345]** [.042]***
Temperature (10 year MA) .805 .161
(.499) (.071)**
[.409]** [.055]***
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 34 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in round parentheses. Conley (1999) standard
errors are reported in square brackets. Significance levels are ***< 0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions
control for population density.
These effects can be favourably compared to Hsiang et al’s (2013) meta-
analysis of the literature on climate and conflict, which finds that a standard
deviation increase in temperature causes a 4% median increase in interper-
sonal violence, and a 14% increase in intergroup violence, across studies.
Hsiang and his coauthors classify Tanzanian witch killings as “Personal
Violence and Crime,” and claim that these median figures are substantial,
lending support to my results on Scottish witch trials.
5.2 Robustness
It is possible that I am not accounting for time-varying, county-specific
factors that might affect witchcraft prosecutions. I thus repeat the analy-
sis using county-specific time trends in Table 3. The results are still positive,
large, and generally significant: for example, in column (6), a standard devi-
ation increase in temperature (10 year MA) causes a 0.19 standard deviation
increase in the probability of a trial, or 5.63%. As in Table 2, the results
that are not significant are found in Columns (1) and (3); in these cases,
the weather shock does not predict the intensity of trials with significance,
though the resutls are of a favourable magnitude.
In Table 4, I conduct additional robustness checks by changing the em-
pirical specification. In Columns (1)-(3), I run a logistic regression analysis,
and in columns (4)-(6), I use ln(trials+1) as my dependent variable. Results
are still large and significant.
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Table 3 - Main Results with County-Specific Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Count Count Count Dummy Dummy Dummy
Temperature (3 year MA) .619 .110**
(.571) (.049)
Temperature (5 year MA) . .850** .126***
(.374) (.036)
Temperature (10 year MA) . .962 .194**
(.601) (.084)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 34 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are ***<
0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions control for population density.
Table 4 - Main Results: Different Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Dummy Dummy Dummy ln ln ln
Temperature (3 year MA) .012* .149*
(.008) (.076)
Temperature (5 year MA) . .024*** .176***
(.009) (.061)
Temperature (10 year MA) . .004 .220**
(.011) (.101)
Robustness Check: Logit Logit Logit Dep Var Dep Var Dep Var
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 34 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are ***<
0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions control for population density.
As an additional check, I exclude trials prior to 1610. This is for two
reasons. First, King James set off a national witch panic in 1590 when he ac-
cused witches of trying to kill him by sinking his ship. Thus, witch trials in
1590 were not due to local factors. Furthermore, Goodare (2002) claims that
autonomous local trials, without central approval, occurred prior to 1610.
These trials were conducted in regality courts, private courts that landlords
held to settle disputes, and so were not as costly as establishing a commis-
sion of justiciary. Results are shown in Table 5. The results are significant,
and larger than before, as I would expect. For example, in column (1) a stan-
dard deviation increase in temperature (3 year MA) causes a 0.11 standard
deviation increase in trials. Favourable weather continues to cause more
witchcraft trials.
Furthermore, it is possible that political events in the 1650s to 1660s are
driving these results. As I discuss later, this period involved English oc-
cupation of Scotland, and it is possible that lairds were forced to demon-
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Table 5 - Excluding Years Prior to 1610
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Count Count Count Dummy Dummy Dummy
Temperature (3 year MA) 1.12** .196***
(.545) (.059)
Temperature (5 year MA) . 1.30*** .228***
(.413) (.059)
Temperature (10 year MA) . 1.50*** .290***
(.526) (.095)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 34 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 4,012 4,012 4,012 4,012 4,012 4,012
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are ***<
0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions control for population density.
strate subservience to their English overlords by, among other tasks, trying
witches.12 I therefore repeat the analysis in Table 2, by excluding the 1650s
and 1660s from my analysis. The results, reported in Table 6, remain large
and significant. For instance, in column (6), a standard deviation increase in
the temperature shock causes a 5% increase in witch trials.
Table 6 - Excluding the ‘Turbulet’ 1650s to 1660s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Count Count Count Dummy Dummy Dummy
Temperature (3 year MA) .276 .091*
(.282) (.077)
Temperature (5 year MA) .539* .114**
(.312) (.042)
Temperature (10 year MA) .773* .173**
(.451) (.073)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 34 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 4,896 4,896 4,896 4,896 4,896 4,896
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are ***<
0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions control for population density.
My crucial identifying assumption is that weather is unrelated to unob-
servables that could bias my estimates. To determine if this is in fact the
case, I perform a placebo test in Table 7, replacing current moving-average
weather shocks with future moving-average weather shocks (one year for-
ward). If my identification is sound, then there is no reason that future
weather should predict current witch trials. As my results show, there is no
significant relationship between witch trials and future weather, and the co-
efficient estimates are smaller than those for my main results. For example,
12 Indeed, my data show that 384 witches were tried in the 1650s, and 647 in the 1660s, for
a total of 1,031.
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in column (2), a standard deviation increase in the five-year moving aver-
age predicts only a 0.01 standard deviation increase in trials. Compare this
to column (2) in Table 2, with a 0.06 standard deviation increase in trials
predicted. This supports my identification strategy.
Table 7 - Future Weather Shocks (One Year Forward) and Current Witch Trials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Count Count Count Dummy Dummy Dummy
Temperature (3 year MA) -.277 .048
(.297) (.068)
Temperature (5 year MA) . .158 .085
(.415) (.061)
Temperature (10 year MA) . .417 .120
(.404) (.071)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 34 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are ***<
0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions control for population density.
An alternate explanation for these patterns is greed: namely, witchcraft
suspects had possessions that neighbours and the Crown wished to seize,
and these possessions increased in value during beneficial years. There
were a handfull of cases like this - notably, there were seven high-status
women who were accused by heavily indebted men with property disputes
(Yeoman, 2002). However, most such prosecutions failed, and the vast ma-
jority of witchcraft suspects were low-status women with no valuable prop-
erty. Of the 316 witch suspects in my dataset whose socioeconomic status is
known, only 9 are classified as either “Lairds/Baron” or “Nobility/Chiefs”.
Given the time and resources it took to try witches, historians do not believe
that witchcraft trials were driven by greed (Goodare, 2010). Early Modern
Scots, including educated elites, believed strongly in witchcraft, and were
willing to take concrete measures to extirpate evil.
In Table 8, I briefly consider simple lagged temperature shocks, since
my hypothesis depends crucially on the buildup of elite resources prior to
a trial. In other words, elites need to accumulate resources over time in
order for trials to occur, while there is unsatisfied demand. Although only
column (4) in Table 4.7 is significant, all specifications yield positive and
large coefficients. For example, column (2) shows that a standard deviation
increase in temperature causes a 0.08 standard deviation increase in trials.
My hypothesis of a supply-side constraint is further demonstrated throu-
gh a political incident: the 1660 end of Republican occupation of Scotland.
After the English republicans left Scotland to its own devices, there was an
outbreak of witchcraft trials. According to my data, only 2 trials were held
in 1660. From 1661-1662, there were 612 witches prosecuted. Although this
was a political event, it nonetheless supports my resource constraint theory
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Table 8 - Effect of Temperature Shocks on Witchcraft Trials: One Year Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Count Count Dummy Dummy
Temperature .093 .524 .067 .123**
(.372) (.367) (.055) (.060)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 5,610 4,012 5,610 4,012
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are ***<
0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions control for population density.
of Scottish witch trials.
Finally, in Table A1 in the appendix, I regress witchcraft trials on lagged
trials, to determine whether there is persistence in trials. Although the pre-
vious two years appear to significantly predict trials, trials in general do not
appear to be significant. A standard deviation increase in the occurrence of
a trial in the previous year causes a .174 rise in the probability of a trial in
the current year. Across specifications, the coefficients are comparable; this
makes sense, given that the temperature shocks are moving averages that
are strongly correlated with each other (a 3-year moving average is strongly
correlated with a 5-year one, for example).
I have documented a robust relationship between beneficial tempera-
tures and witchcraft prosecutions. This fits well with the observations that
local elites required resources to conduct witchcraft prosecutions. It also
supports my theoretical prediction that years of higher income should ex-
perience more trials.
5.3 Compliers
In Table 9, I interact the 5 year moving average weather shock with var-
ious compliers. First, I examine whether distance from Edinburgh had an
impact. Those wishing to try a witch had to seek the Privy Council or par-
liament’s permission in Edinburgh; in my model, this proxies for a higher
marginal cost of conducting a trial. Indeed, I find that a greater distance
from Edinburgh (higher than median) attenuates the impact of the shock on
trials.
I then determine whether having more justices of the peace has an im-
pact. Data on justices of the peace are available for every county except
Cromarty, and therefore my sample size is slightly smaller. More justices of
the peace implies a lower marginal cost of conducting a trial, since there is
some legal state capacity available to try a witch. Indeed, this amplifies the
impact of the shock.
To get a sense of the marginal benefit of prosecuting a witch, I infer that
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Table 9 - Effect of Temperature Shocks on Witchcraft Trials: One Year Lags
Dependent variable: witch trials (1) (2) (3) (4)
Temperature (5 year MA) .194*** .198 .270 2.045**
(.052) (.539) (.216) (.804)
Temperature × interaction -.060*** .813* 10.09* -1.043**
(.021) (.472) (5.42) (.482)
Interacted variable: Distance from Justices of Political Distance from
Edinburgh the Peace Crises a Port
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 33 34 34
No. of observations 5,610 5,445 5,610 5,610
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are ***<
0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions control for population density.
during times of national political crisis, the marignal benefit increases - i.e.,
it is dangerous to let witches roam during these times. I use Levack (2008) to
identify five periods of political instability. These are as follows: In 1590-91,
James I was fending off a series of rebellions; In 1597, there was a large-
scale quarrel between church and the state; In 1643-44, a radical group of
presbyterians, the covenanters, consolidated political power in Scotland; In
1649-50, some covenanters fought English military efforts to occupy Scot-
land; Finally, in 1661-1662, the covenanters were displaced by royal power.
I code each of these years as a ‘1’, and a zero otherwise, and then interact
this with the weather shock. Clearly, times of crisis exacerbate the impact of
this shock on trials. This corresponds to an increase in the marginal benefit,
leading to more witch trials.
Finally, I examine distance from the nearest trade port. Counties further
from trading ports have less access to alternate sources of income. If this
is greater than median, I indicate this as a ‘1’, with a zero otherwise. This
is intended to capture y, the value of income. According to my model, the
smaller this income is, the less likely a trial is to occur. Indeed, a higher dis-
tance from a port attenuates the impact of the shock on witch trials, lending
support to my hypothesis.
5.4 Mechanisms
Because local elites, such as lairds and burgesses, were responsible for
the time and money involved in carrying out witch trials, I expect that posi-
tive shocks to their income would lead to more witchcraft trials. Specifically,
as a proxy variable for elite income, price shocks to export-heavy, taxable
commodities like herring and wool should have an impact on trials, while
price shocks to Scotland’s main subsistence commodity, oats, should have
no effect.
Historical evidence states that local elites derived income not only from
peasant rents, but also from exports. Customs duties were levelled on goods
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Table 10 - Effect of Wool and Herring Shocks on Witch Trials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Shock: Wool Wool Wool Herring Herring Herring
3 year MA .198** .019**
(.092) (.009)
5 year MA . .186** .018**
(.087) (.008)
10 year MA . .236** .015**
(.103) (.007)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 34 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are ***<
0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions control for population density.
exiting Scotland, helping to fill the coffers of burgesses and lairds through
customs farming. Evidence from Gowrie and Aberdeen also suggests that
tenants paid landlords rents in the form of surplus agricultural produce,
which landlords then sold to merchants to buttress their income (Young,
2007; Whyte, 1986). Furthermore, many elites (burgesses) of royal burghs
and burghs of barony were themselves merchants, who relied on export
income to exert local political and economic power (Brown, 1992; Smout,
1973). Based on data from the Atlas of Scottish History to 1707, I was able to
identify two of the most common exports: wool, and herring. Based on a
1614 survey of exports from the Atlas, wools and wool products composed
about 15% of total exports, while herring composed 13% of total exports.
Fells (timber) is the only commodity that comprises a larger percentage of
exports (21%), but based on customs receipts from 1595 to 1599, wool and
herring were taxed at a higher rate than fells. I therefore focus on wool and
herring as examples of export-heavy, taxable commodities.
Scotland’s main subsistence commodity, oats, was not exported much at
all. Oats comprise 0.4% of total exports, based on the 1614 survey. Oats’
short growing season combined with their nutritious content made them a
staple diet among Scots (Smout, 1973). Therefore, although it was an impor-
tant crop, oats do not contribute significantly to elite income, and therefore
should not impact witch trials.
My reduced form relationship between weather and witch trials requires
some discussion here. Warm temperatures in Scotland were important for
growing oats, but also for producing wool and catching herring. Veterinary
studies show that sheep shear better when temperatures are warm, and they
can die or fall ill under inclement conditions (Glass and Jacob, 1991; Torell et
al., 1969). With regards to herring, a common method of storage at the time
was salting (Rorke, 2005), which works better under warmer temperatures.
It is also more likely for fishing boats to sail when the weather is good.
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A limitation of this study is that hardly any systematic agricultural yield
data have survived from this period. This means that I cannot directly
test for the impact of temperatures on agricultural productivity. However,
Young (2007), while admitting that “[t]he survival from this period of sys-
tematic recordings of the yields obtained on Scottish farms is extremely
rare,” nonetheless manages to unearth data from one particular farm in
the Carse of Gowrie, over a 23 year period (1673-95). She examines wheat,
bere, oats, and pease yields in the farm, and concludes that of all the factors
that affect output, climate and weather are the most important. Warmer
climates and temperatures are better suited to crop production in Scotland
than colder spells, which would destroy crops. Given this historical evi-
dence, combined with the scientific studies previously mentioned I can be
more confident in establishing the link between warm weather and favoura-
ble agricultural output in early modern Scotland.
In Table 10, I show the regressions for wool/herring price shocks and
witch trials. Total witch trials is the outcome variable. Clearly, higher prices
of both commodities lead to more trials. For example, in column (1), a stan-
dard deviation increase in the wool price shock (3 year MA) increases trials
by 0.15 standard deviations. In column (4), a standard deviation increase in
the herring price shock (3 year MA) increases trials by 0.10 standard devia-
tions. In the Appendix, Table A2, I also control for the temperature shock,
and interact the temperature shock with the wool or herring price shock; the
results are generally preserved, but slightly weaker. In particular, the tem-
perature shock loses signifiance; this aligns well with my theoretical pre-
dictions, since if price shocks are the mechanism through which elites gain
income to try witches, then temperature works through price shocks to affect
witchcraft trials – meaning that temperature shocks would lose significance.
The Appendix analysis shows that the herring and wool price shocks retain
their statistical significance.
Table 11 - Effect of Oats Shocks on Witch Trials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
3 year MA shock -.013 .011 -.0006
(.011) (.013) (.0006)
5 year MA shock . -.012 .008 -.0004
(.010) (.011) (0.0004)
10 year MA shock . -.011 .008 -.001*
(.009) (.011) (.0006)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Counties 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 5,610 2,890 2,822 2,652
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are ***<
0.01, **< 0.05, and *< 0.1. All regressions control for population density.
In Table 11, I regress witch trials on oat price shocks. In columns (1)-(3),
I interact the world oats price with the FAO data for oats suitability. There
21
is no significant effect, although the coefficient estimates’ sizes are compa-
rable to those for herring and wool. In column (3), a standard deviation
increase in the oat price shock reduces trials by 0.13 standard deviations.
The coefficient estimates are negative, which could suggest the following
story: peasants who grow and sell oats blame witches when oat prices are
low. Although this is plausible, there is no historical evidence to support it,
and at any rate, the coefficients are insignificant: even if peasants complain
about witches, elites need the resources to prosecute. In columns (4)-(6), I
interact the world oats price with HYDE data for cropland usage, and again
find an insignificant impact, although it is now positive, further indicating
that the oats price does not robustly predict trials. The effect is still siz-
able - for instance, in column (4), a standard deviation increase in the oats
shock predicts a 0.09 standard deviation increase in witchcraft trials - how-
ever, given the overall insignificance, and the fact that this insignificance is
robust across specifications, I can conclude that oats shocks do not predict
witch trials. In columns (7)-(9), I use Gibson and Smout’s (1994) oats price
data for Fife, and again find an overall insignificant effect. However, in
column (9), the 10-year-moving-average is slightly significant, and the coef-
ficient estimate is large: a standard deviation increase in the shock reduces
trials by 0.18 standard deviations. Nonetheless, the overall impact of oats
prices on trials appears insignificant.
There is, additionally, anecdotal evidence that spending on other public
goods increased following favourable weather. The town of Aberdeen, for
example, was unique in its retention of a large Justice of the Peace Court,
which tried crimes like fornication and adultery. Running the court was
fairly expensive and, according to DesBrisay (1986),
The forces of nature could clearly influence the court’s work: in
1697, when... poor weather and serious food shortages led to dis-
ease and high mortality, the justice court sat only thirteen times...
it seems likely that backlogs of cases occasionally built up. (p. 81)
It therefore makes sense that witch trials would increase following favou-
rable temperature.
6 Conclusion
Persecution of populations is not always a disorganised, unruly affair.
Events like the Khmer Rouge killings, East Timorese massacres, and Rwan-
dan genocide were all planned and organised by elites. Similarly, Early
Modern Scottish witchcraft trials required local elites’ time and material re-
sources.
In this paper, I have shown that positive weather shocks caused more
witchcraft trials in Early Modern Scotland. During such good times, local
elites had more resources to devote to witch prosecutions. Consistent with
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this, I find that positive price shocks to export-heavy, taxable commodities,
herring and wool, caused more trials, while shocks to oats, Scotland’s main
subsistence commodity, did not.
A further question raised by this paper is that of policy: namely, how
can we prevent persecution, when elites finance it? Based on my findings,
the answer might be to target the export of goods that elites derive wealth
and power from.13 Indeed, such sanctions are used against states like North
Korea and Iran ostensibly for this purpose (Elliot, 1998; Marinov, 2005). An
Early Modern ‘omnipotent economic planner’ wishing to limit witchcraft
trials would therefore sanction the export of wool and herring from Scot-
land. Pertinent economic and political actors may react unexpectedly to
sanctions; however, the policy implications of this approach are worth ex-
amining in future research.
13 This abstracts from general equilibrium concerns. Sanctions can, after all, harm even
persecuted populations by denying them of food, medicine, and income.
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